In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
Introduction
In game theory the centerpiece of analysis is the notion of an equilibrium. In a game in strategic form, an equilibrium is a strategy profile at which certain types of coalitions of agents do not have profitable deviations. The strongest notion that can be defined along this line is a super strong equilibrium: no coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Note that in a game with n agents there are as many as 2 n − 1 (non-empty) possible coalitions if any coalition is deemed viable. However, deeming every coalition viable and disqualifying strategy profiles as non-equilibrium may be misguided. First of all, a super strong equilibrium rarely exists in a game. Therefore, restrictions on coalition formation may be helpful to obtain existence results 1 . This is the very same idea behind the well-known Nash equilibrium [16] solution concept where only singletons are viable coalitions. In this paper, our goal is to fill the gap between the less restrictive Nash equilibrium notion and the very restrictive super strong equilibrium notion. The restrictions we enforce upon coalitions are not merely mathematical generalizations, but also motivated by many real-life examples.
Coalition formation may be restricted by coordinational, communicational and institutional constraints.
-Coordinational: A deviation by a coalition requires coalition members to act in unison.
However, if coalition members are not familiar with one another, taking coordinated action becomes difficult. Or, everyone may be familiar with one another yet agents may find it more difficult to coordinate as the number of coalition members grows. -Communicational: Formation of coalitions may require private communication. For instance, imagine that agents communicate through a network where each agent is located at one of the nodes. If some agent i wants to offer a deviation to another agent j, then agent i had better make sure that his offer does not deteriorate any of the agents along the path, since otherwise it will probably not reach agent j. -Institutional: Even if there does not exist any coordinational or communicational barrier between two agents to form a coalition, there might exists self-imposed institutional constraints. In global affairs, it is not uncommon that a government feels compelled to act in unison with its allies even if doing so comes at a great cost. For instance, it may be forced to uphold trade sanctions on a neighboring country, causing much harm on its economy. Or, a nation may refuse to engage in mutually beneficial relations with another nation due to historical enmities.
Note that a full consideration of what restrictions on coalition formation may be reasonable in a specific real-life scenario is beyond the scope of our paper. We rather focus on restrictions that are motivated by natural real-life social structures that may arise in various settings.
On the basis of our restrictions, we define new equilibrium notions and then study how they relate to one another, and when they are guaranteed to exist. Adding social structures 1 In defining our equilibrium notions we use the weak domination relation: a deviation makes coalition members better off in the Pareto sense. An alternative approach is to define an equilibrium using the strong domination relation: a deviation makes every coalition member strictly better off. Even when the strong domination relation is used, an equilibrium rarely exists in a game if every coalition is viable (the so-called strong equilibrium notion). For studies on strong equilibrium, its existence, and some other related work, see [3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 15] .
to games is actually a growing trend in the recent literature. The following equilibrium notion introduced in an earlier study is related to our study in particular 2 :
-Partition Equilibrium: In a partition equilibrium, it is assumed that the set of viable coalitions is a partition of the set of agents; see Figure 1a . This notion generalizes the notion of a Nash equilibrium and has been introduced by Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] . Along similar lines we introduce in our paper three new notions of equilibrium, motivated by real-life social structures: -Laminar Equilibrium: In a laminar equilibrium, it is assumed that the set of viable coalitions exhibits a laminar structure; see Figure 1b . This notion is mainly motivated by institutional constraints as it relates to hierarchical communities in real life. For instance, a military is divided into corps, legions, and brigades; a cabinet is divided into ministries, departments, and directorates; a university is divided into faculties and departments; and a company is divided into business units, divisions, and departments. -Contiguous Equilibrium: In a contiguous equilibrium, it is assumed that agents are distributed on a line and each viable coalition consists of some agents that are ordered on the line subsequently; see Figure 2a . A contiguous coalition structure may emerge in real life due to coordinational, communicational and institutional constraints as depicted in following scenarios, respectively: i) Residents of a street are most likely to socialize via neighbourhood, ii) When private communication between players are restricted in an environment such as a queue, iii) When agents are positioned on left-right political spectrum, coalitions presumably cannot be formed without intermediaries. -Centralized Equilibrium: In a centralized equilibrium, it is assumed that agents are distributed on a plane and each viable coalition corresponds to a circle on the plane such that a coalition member lies at the circle's center and the agents that lie inside the circle are the coalition members; see Figure 2b . A centralized coalition structure may emerge in real life due to coordinational, communicational and institutional constraints as depicted in following scenarios, respectively: i) Residents of a neighbourhood are more likely to socialize inside a closed distance, ii) When agents can only communicate within a specific distance due to various reasons, such as wireless coverage, iii) When agents are positioned on a political compass, the radius of a coalition corresponds to the tolerance of its center (possibly the leader) to other political views.
Notice that the number of viable coalitions is O(n) in the case of a partition equilibrium or a laminar equilibrium, and it is O(n 2 ) in the case of a contiguous equilibrium or a centralized equilibrium (where n is the number of agents). However, the number of possible coalition w.r.t. the number of agents for these notions are beyond the scope of our paper 3 . In Theorem 1, we show that each equilibrium notion above generalizes the preceding one.
As an application we study the existence of the above notions of equilibrium in resource selection games (RSGs), for the following reasons:
-RSGs fall into the class of potential games for which the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed (see [14, 18] ). Since the newly defined solution concepts are generalizations of Nash equilibrium, existence of equilibria w.r.t. them is not guaranteed in classes of games for which Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist. -However, super strong equilibrium does not exist even in the simplest special cases of this class of games. Hence, it is not trivial whether existence of equilibria w.r.t. the above solution concepts is guaranteed or not. -RSGs are a subclass of congestion games [18] which has immense number of applications [6, 8, 11, 13] . Simple as they may be, RSGs capture the essence of various games especially in the domain of routing games. In this setting, they are mostly known as parallel-link networks. For recent literature on parallel-link networks, see [19] and the references therein.
-Aside from their natural applications in transportation and communication networks
RSGs have been also shown to be useful in biology [12, 17] . -Not only the immediate previous work [1, 5] , but also several other newly defined solution concepts [6, 7] were studied for RSGs. So, RSGs are a benchmark to study existence of equilibrium w.r.t. newly defined solution concepts ( [6] uses the term symmetric load balancing games for RSGs).
Our results in RSGs and their relation to the results in the literature are as follows: Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] showed that a partition equilibrium always exists in RSGs under the following restrictions: (i) if the size of a viable coalition is bounded by 2; or (ii) if there are only two resources; or (iii) if the resources are identical. Anshelevich et al. [1] generalized this result by proving a strategy profile that is both a partition equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in general RSGs. Our findings are as follows: -In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we generalize the results (ii) and (iii) above in [5] to the notion of a laminar equilibrium. We prove that a laminar equilibrium always exists: i) If there are only two resources (Theorem 6), or ii) If the resources are identical (Corollary 12). Note that RSGs with two resources is interesting in its own right. For instance, the well-known P oA = 4/3 result for selfish routing also holds for parallel-link networks with two links [20] . -In Section 3.1, we show that an analogous generalization of the result in [1] is not possible.
Via an intricate counterexample, we show that a laminar equilibrium may not exist in general RSGs (Theorem 8) . Indeed, our counterexample shows that in general RSGs there may not exist a strategy profile that is Pareto efficient, a partition equilibrium, and a Nash equilibrium (Corollary 9). Notice that the main existence result in [1] does not survive a minimal extension of their domain of viable set of coalitions, i.e., when the set of all agents is added to the viable set of coalitions. -In Section 3.2, we prove that a contiguous equilibrium may not always exist in an RSG with two resources (Theorem 13). We show that, however, a contiguous equilibrium always exists when resources are identical (Theorem 11). -In Section 3.2, we show that, however, a centralized equilibrium may not exist even in the very special setting in which there are two identical resources (Theorem 14). In the two identical resources setting, Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] showed that a super strong equilibrium may not exist. 
2
The Equilibrium Notions
This section introduces our equilibrium notions in the context of a strategic form game and then studies how these notions are related.
Let N, S, U be a strategic form game where N is a finite set of agents (or players), S : (S j ) j∈N is the strategy space and U : S → R |N | is the payoff function. Agent j's payoff at strategy profile s ∈ S is denoted by U j (s). 4 A coalition c is a non-empty subset of agents. Let P(N ) be the power set of N . Then the domain of coalitions is P(N ) − {∅}. Let P ≥1 (N ) denote this domain. A coalition structure C is a set of viable coalitions; i.e., C ⊆ P ≥1 (N ).
Let S c denote the restriction of the strategy space for coalition c. Let s c denote the restriction of the strategy profile s for coalition c. That is, S c = (S j ) j∈c and s c = (s j ) j∈c . Note that the strategy space can be written as (S c , S N c ). The space S c represents the domain of deviations for coalition c. At s if coalition c takes deviation s c ∈ S c , the resulting strategy profile is ( s c , s N c ) ∈ (S c , S N c ). This is a profitable deviation for coalition c if for each j ∈ c, U j ( s c , s N c ) ≥ U j (s), and for some j ∈ c, U j ( s c , s N c ) > U j (s). That is, the deviation makes coalition c better off in the Pareto sense. A strategy profile s is called c-stable if coalition c has no profitable deviation at s, and C-stable if for coalition structure C, s is c-stable for each c ∈ C.
Notice that a strategy profile is a super strong equilibrium if it is P ≥1 (N )-stable, and a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if it is P =1 (N )-stable where P =1 (N ) = {c ⊂ N | |c| = 1}. We now define the partition equilibrium which was introduced in the earlier literature, and the three notions of equilibrium which are introduced first in our paper.
-Partition Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is a partition if for each j ∈ N , there exists a unique coalition c ∈ C such that j ∈ c. Given a partition coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a partition equilibrium if it is C-stable. -Laminar Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is laminar if for any two coalitions
Given a laminar coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a laminar equilibrium if it is C-stable. -Contiguous Equilibrium: A coalition structure C is contiguous if there exists a path P : j 1 −j 2 −· · ·−j |N | (the vertices are agents) in accordance with C in the following sense: for each c ∈ C, the agents in c are subsequently ordered under P . Given a contiguous coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a contiguous equilibrium if it is C-stable.
, which is in accordance with C in the following sense:
-For each c ∈ C, in the Cartesian space, ψ (c) corresponds to the following circle: the circle's center is at point φ(ψ 1 (c)) and its radius is ψ 2 (c). -For an agent j, φ(j) lies inside the circle corresponding to ψ (c) (the boundary included) if and only if j ∈ c.
In simpler terms, agents lie on a plane and a viable coalition consists of agents that lie inside a circle with the restriction that one coalition member lies at the circle's center. Given a centralized coalition structure C, a strategy profile is a centralized equilibrium if it is C-stable.
Also, let C pe , C le , C coe , C cee be, respectively, the domains of coalition structures that are partitions, laminar, contiguous, and centralized. Thus, a strategy profile that is C-stable is a super strong equilibrium if C ∈ C sse ; a Nash equilibrium if C ∈ C ne ; a partition equilibrium if C ∈ C pe , and so on.
Recall that our equilibrium notions are inspired by various real-life social structures. So it could well be the case that they are not interrelated. However, we show that each equilibrium notion above generalizes the preceding one, in Theorem 1, the proof of which appears in Appendix A.
That is, centralized equilibrium is a generalization of contiguous equilibrium, contiguous equilibrium is a generalization of laminar equilibrium, laminar equilibrium is a generalization of partition equilibrium, partition equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium. Super strong equilibrium is a refinement of all these equilibrium notions. The generalizations and the refinement are nontrivial for |N | ≥ 4.
An Application: Resource Selection Games
A resource selection game (RSG) is a triplet N, M, f where N : {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of agents, M : {1, 2, . . . , m} is the set of resources and f :
is the profile of strictly monotonic increasing cost functions such that f i (0) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. When q agents use resource i, each incurs a cost equal to f i (q). Each agent tries to minimize the cost it incurs. In the rest of the paper we fix the game N, M, f .
An allocation is a sequence a :
Above, a i denotes the set of agents that are assigned to resource i at allocation a. Thus, at allocation a, each agent in a i incurs a cost equal to f i (|a i |). Let A be the domain of allocations.
The maxcost of an allocation a is the maximum cost incurred by an agent at a. That is, the maxcost of allocation a equals max i∈M f i (|a i |). The minmaxcost of the RSG, to be denoted by α, is the maxcost of the allocation whose maxcost is smallest. That is,
We refer to q i as resource i's quota. That is, a resource's quota is the maximum number of agents that can be assigned to it without making its cost exceed α. We distinguish between resources which can and cannot attain the minmaxcost α. A resource i is a Type 1 resource if f i (q i ) = α, and a Type 2 resource if f i (q i ) < α.
Let T 1 and T 2 denote, respectively, the sets of type 1 and type 2 resources. Since the minmaxcost of the game is α, we have T 1 = ∅. Also, for i ∈ T 1 , let β i = f i (q i − 1). We refer to β i as resource i's beta value. Note that for a type 1 resource i, its beta value is its cost when the number of agents assigned to it is one less than its quota.
Note that an RSG is a non-cooperative game in the strategic form although its formulation here is different from the formulation of a strategic form game in Section 2. Here, agents' payoffs are negative (i.e., they incur costs rather than receive payoffs) and an agent's strategy space is the set M (i.e., the agent selects one of the resources).
In this context, we continue to use the terminology in Section 2 in regards to coalitions and coalition structures; i.e., c, C, P =1 (N ), P ≥1 (N ), C sse , C ne , C le , C coe , C cee are as described in Section 2. We also use the terminology in Section 2 regarding the stability and equilibrium notions but with one exception: Note that in an RSG an allocation fully specifies the strategies of agents. Therefore, in this context we speak of an "allocation" as a substitute for a strategy profile. Hence, in this context, rather than a strategy profile we speak of an allocation being c-stable or C-stable; or being a laminar equilibrium or a contiguous equilibrium.
Also, in this context, we represent a deviation by a coalition c as a sequence (
That is, a deviation is an agreement by coalition members on which resources they will use: c i is the set of coalition members who agree to use resource i. We use a • (c i ) m i=1 to denote the allocation that results when coalition c takes deviation (c i ) m i=1 at allocation a: i.e., after the deviation the set of agents that are assigned to resource i is (a i c) ∪ c i . Also, note that a deviation is a profitable deviation if at the resulting allocation each coalition member becomes weakly better off (i.e., the cost it incurs does not increase) and at least one of them becomes better off (i.e., the cost it incurs decreases).
The notion of a super strong equilibrium is very appealing since it precludes profitable deviations by any coalition of agents. However, in most game forms a super strong equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist. The is also true for RSGs; see the Example 2 below.
◮ Example 2 (due to Feldman and Tennenholtz [5] ). Consider the RSG where N = {1, 2, 3},
In this RSG there exists no super strong equilibrium. To see this note that: At an allocation where all agents are assigned to the same resource, an agent that deviates to the other resource becomes better off. In all other allocations, two agents are assigned to one of the resources and one agent is assigned to the other resource. Wlog., let agents 1 and 2 be assigned to resource 1 and agent 3 to resource 2. But now the coalition c = {1, 2} has a profitable deviation: When agent 1 deviates to resource 2, agent 1 becomes weakly better off and agent 2 becomes better off. ♦
We next present a characterization of Nash equilibrium in RSGs given by [1] .
◮ Theorem 3 (due to Anshelevich et al. [1] ). In RSGs there always exists a Nash equilibrium allocation. An allocation a is a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. We need to designate the set of type 1 resources that are not assigned at a up to their quotas: Let L(a) = {i ∈ T 1 | |a i | = q i − 1}. Also, let H(a) = M \ L(a). We refer to the resources in L(a) and in H(a) as low and high resources at a, respectively. The corollary below immediately follows from the above theorem and it will be useful later on.
◮ Corollary 4. Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. Then, |L(a)| = i∈M q i − n and |H(a)| = m − |L(a)|. Therefore, the number of low and high resources are the same at every Nash equilibrium allocation.
The rest of this section is divided into two parts. We present our existence and nonexistence results for laminar equilibrium notion in Section 3.1. We present our existence and non-existence results for contiguous and centralized equilibrium notions in Section 3.2.
Existence and Non-Existence Results for Laminar Equilibrium
In this section, we present our existence and non-existence results for laminar equilibrium. Our results resolves an open question in the literature. In their paper, Anshelevich et al. [1] showed that in an RSG, for any given partition coalition structure, there exists a partition equilibrium, as stated in the following theorem.
◮ Theorem 5 (due to Anshelevich et al. [1] ). In an RSG, for any given partition coalition structure C ∈ C pe , there exists a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable. That is, in an RSG there always exists a partition equilibrium (which is also Nash equilibrium).
They also conjectured that the following more general claim holds true: For any given laminar coalition structure, there exists a laminar equilibrium. We first prove their conjecture for the special setting where there are only two resources. This result is presented below, whose proof is given in Appendix B due to space limitations. ◮ Theorem 6. In a two-resource RSG, for any laminar coalition structure C ∈ C le , there exists a C-stable allocation. That is, laminar equilibrium always exists in RSGs with two resources.
In the next section, we also prove that their conjecture holds for the special setting where the resources are identical (Corollary 12), which is implied by the more general result that contiguous equilibrium always exists in RSGs with identical resources. Alas, we show that in the general setting, their conjecture does not hold.
The rest of this section is devoted to prove that a laminar equilibrium does not necessarily exist in RSGs (Theorem 8). The example that we use to show Theorem 8 is an intricate one, consisting of a large number of agents and resources. We present it below. 
In an RSG, for C ∈ C le , it may be that no allocation is C-stable. That is, in RSGs a laminar equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist.
Proof. In Example 7, consider the following coalition structure: C = {c 1 , . . . , c 6 }∪P =1 (N )∪ {N } where the sets c 1 , . . . , c 6 are disjoint and each has a cardinality of 14052/6 = 2342. Note that C is laminar. We prove the theorem by showing that no C-stable allocation exists in Example 7. By way of contradiction, suppose that in Example 7 there exists an allocation a which is C-stable.
Note that by Corollary 4: |L(a)| = 1001 (= 53 + 8 × 1000 + 7 × 1000 − 14052). And |H(a)| = 2001 − 1001 = 1000. Since P =1 (N ) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, using Corollary 4, at allocation a there are 1001 low resources and 1000 high resources.
We divide the proof into six parts:
By way of contradiction, suppose that x ∈ H (a). Then, in M y ∪ M z , there are 1001 resources that are low. Let i, i ′ be two of them (i = i ′ ). Consider the agents a i ∪ a i ′ . Note
We define allocation a ′ from a as follows.
-Remove the agents in N 1 ∪ N 2 ∪ a i ∪ a i ′ from their assigned resources. -Assign agents in N 1 to resource i, assign agents in N 2 to resource i ′ , and assign agents in a i ∪ a i ′ to resource x.
(The assignments of remaining agents are the same as before.)
At allocation a ′ , the agents assigned to resource x are now better off (since x is now assigned q x − 2 agents). All other agents are equally well-off at the two allocations. But then a is not N -stable, a contradiction. Thus, x ∈ L (a).
By (1), we know that x ∈ L (a). Then, at a, in M y ∪ M z there are 1000 high resources and 1000 low resources. By way of contradiction, suppose that |H (a) ∩ M y | ≥ 8. This implies that |L (a) ∩ M z | ≥ 8. We define allocation a ′ from a as follows. We pick 7 high resources in M y : Wlog., let y 1 , · · · , y 7 ∈ H (a) ∩ M y . We pick 8 low resources in M z : Wlog., let z 1 , · · · , z 8 ∈ L (a) ∩ M z . We pick 49 agents assigned to x at a: Let N x ⊂ a x be such that |N x | = 49. Then: -Remove the agents in N x ∪ a y1 ∪ · · · ∪ a y7 ∪ a z1 ∪ · · · ∪ a z8 from their assigned resources.
-Assign the 49 agents in N x to resources y 1 , · · · , y 7 such that each resource is assigned 7
agents. -Assign the 56 agents in a y1 ∪ · · · ∪ a y7 to resources z 1 , · · · , z 8 such that each resource is assigned 7 agents. -Assign the 48 agents in a z1 ∪ · · · ∪ a z8 to resource x.
At allocation a ′ , the agents assigned to resource x are now better off (since x is now assigned q x − 2 agents). The agents assigned to resources y 1 , · · · , y 7 are also better off (because they are now assigned to low resources for which the beta value is smaller). The agents assigned to resources z 1 , · · · , z 8 are equally well-off (because they are assigned to high resources at both a and a ′ ). The agents assigned to remaining resources are equally well-off. But then a is not N -stable, a contradiction. Thus, |H (a) ∩ M y | ≤ 7. Hence, we also have |H (a) ∩ M z | ≥ 993.
(3) We show that there exists c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c 6 } such that there are at least 1159 agents in c which are assigned to resources in H (a) ∩ M z at allocation a.
Above, by (2), at a there are at least 993 high resources in M z . Since each of them is assigned 7 agents, at a the number of agents assigned to high resources in M z is at least 993 × 7 = 6951. But then by the generalized pigeonhole principle, there is a coalition c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c 6 } such that at a the number of agents in c that are assigned to high resources in M z is at least 6951 6 = 1159.
(4) Let c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c 6 } be as described in (3). We show that there exists z ∈ H (a) ∩ M z such that there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to z at allocation a.
Note that at a the number of high resources in M z is at most 1000 (because |M z | = 1000). By (3) we also know that there are at least 1159 agents in c which are assigned to high resources in M z at allocation a. But then, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists z ∈ H (a) ∩ M z such that there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to z at allocation a.
(5) Let c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c 6 } be as described in (3). We show that for each resource y ∈ L (a) ∩ (M x ∪ M y ), there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to y at allocation a.
By (4) there exists z ∈ H (a) ∩ M z such that there are at least two agents in c that are assigned to z at allocation a. Thus, let j, j ′ ∈ c be such that j = j ′ and at a the agents j and j ′ are assigned to resource z.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists
Suppose that |c ∩ a y | = 0. We define allocation a ′ from a as follows: Agent j is removed from resource z and then assigned to resource y. It is clear that at a ′ coalition c is better off. But then a is not C-stable, a contradiction. Thus, |c ∩ a y | = 0.
Suppose that |c ∩ a y | = 1. Let j be the agent in c ∩ a y . We define allocation a ′ from a as follows: Agents j and j ′ are removed from resource z and then assigned to resource y, and agent j is removed from resource y and then assigned to resource z. Note that at a ′ the agents j and j ′ are equally well-off (they are still assigned to high resources) and the agents in c that are assigned to z ( j and perhaps some other agents) are better off (because z is now a low resource, and the beta value for z is smaller than the beta value for y). The remaining agents in c are equally well-off. But then a is not C-stable, a contradiction. Thus, |c ∩ a y | = 1. Therefore, |c ∩ a y | ≥ 2. In light of our findings in Section 2, Theorem 8 also has the following corollary:
◮ Corollary 10. In an RSG, the existence of a contiguous equilibrium, or of a centralized equilibrium, is also not guaranteed.
Existence and Non-Existence Results for Contiguous and Centralized Equilibrium
In this section we present several existence and nonexistence results for contiguous and centralized equilibrium notions. We first prove that a contiguous equilibrium exists when the resources are identical.
◮ Theorem 11. In an identical-resource RSG, for any given contiguous coalition structure C ∈ C coe , there exists a C-stable allocation. That is, in an RSG with identical resources, there always exists a contiguous equilibrium.
Proof. We proceed in two parts: First, in the identical resources setting we find a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium allocation to be c-stable. Then, using this condition, for C ∈ C coe , we construct a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable. Our construction is a simple one and it helps us find a Nash equilibrium allocation which is C-stable in linear time.
(1) Let a be a Nash equilibrium allocation. Let c be some coalition of agents. We show that a is c-stable if for every pair of resources i ∈ H(a) and i ′ ∈ L(a), |a i ∩ c| ≤ |a i ′ ∩ c| + 1.
By way of contradiction, suppose that c satisfies the above condition yet
. Since resources are identical, their quotas and beta values are the same. Let their quotas be q and their beta values be β.
Suppose that for resource i, |a i | > q. Then, it is clear that c i = ∅. Let j ∈ c i . Then at a agent j incurs a cost greater than the minmaxcost α. Recall that at a Nash equilibrium allocation no agent incurs a cost greater than α. Then, j is worse off at a than at a. This contradicts that (c i ) m i=1 is a profitable deviation at a. Thus, for each resource i, we have |a i | ≤ q i .
Suppose that for each resource i, |a i | < q. But then at a, at each resource the cost incurred is less than the minmaxcost α, a contradiction. Hence, there exists a resource, say i, such that |a i | = q. But then, the theorem by Anshelevich et al. [1] and its corollary (presented above) show that: the allocation a is a Nash equilibrium; |H(a)| = |H(a)|; and |L(a)| = |L(a)|.
Let d X ⊆ c denote the subset of coalition members that are assigned to resources in X ⊆ M at allocation a. Similarly, let d X ⊆ c denote the subset of coalition members that are assigned to resources in X ⊆ M at allocation a. (2) We show that for each C ∈ C coe , there exists an allocation a such that a is a Nash equilibrium and the condition in (1) is satisfied for every c ∈ C.
Let C ∈ C coe . Let P be a path in accordance with coalition structure C. Wlog., let P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. To show (2) we will show that for C, there exists an allocation a that satisfies the condition in (1) for every c ∈ C. We will construct this allocation with Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1
1: j ← 1 2: for i = 1, . . . , n do 3: assign agent i to resource j 4: j ← (j mod m) + 1
Observe that Algorithm 1 places the agents one by one to the resources; and when it reaches the last resource, it rolls over to the first resource again. Therefore, the number of agents on each pair of resources will differ by at most one at the end of the algorithm. Since each resource's quota is the same, this means that the above algorithm constructs a Nash equilibrium allocation a where H(a) = {1, . . . , |H(a)|} and L(a) = {|H(a)| + 1, . . . , m} due to Theorem 3.
Since for any pair of resources i ∈ H(a) and i ′ ∈ L(a) we have i < i ′ , before the algorithm assigns an agent to a low resource, it always assigns an agent to each high resource. Therefore, before the algorithm assigns a member of coalition c ∈ C to a high resource i ∈ H(a) for the first time, it might have been assigned another member of c to a low resource i ′ ∈ L(a) at most once.
On the other hand, after the algorithm assigns a member of coalition c ∈ C to a high resource i ∈ H(a) for the first time, before it assigns another member of c to i, it needs to assign a member of c to all other resources, since the agents in c are subsequently ordered under P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. Therefore, we have |a i ∩ c| ≤ |a i ′ ∩ c| + 1 for any low resource i ′ ∈ L(a). This means that, at allocation a, for each coalition c ∈ C, the condition in (1) is satisfied. ◭
In light of our findings in Section 2, Theorem 11 also has the following corollary:
◮ Corollary 12. In an identical-resource RSG, for any given laminar coalition structure C ∈ C le , there exists a C-stable allocation. That is, in an RSG with identical resources, there always exists a laminar equilibrium.
Nonetheless, we show that contiguous equilibrium may not exist when there are two nonidentical resources. We present this result below, whose proof is given in Appendix C. ◮ Theorem 13. In an RSG with two resources, for C ∈ C coe , it may be that no allocation is C-stable. That is, in an RSG a contiguous equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist even when the number of resources is restricted to 2.
We finally prove that a centralized equilibrium may not exist even for the two identical resources case. Note that what makes this result interesting is that even though centralized coalition structures contain O(n 2 ) viable coalitions (instead of 2 n −1 coalitions), equilibrium may not exist in the two-identical resources setting, i.e., it strengths the non-existence result of super strong equilibrium given in Example 2. We present this result below, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
◮ Theorem 14.
In an RSG with two identical resources, for C ∈ C cee , it may be that no allocation is C-stable. That is, in an RSG a centralized equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist even under the restriction that there are two identical resources.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem in six parts.
(1) C ne ⊆ C pe since P =1 (N ) is a partition over N . Let C ∈ C pe . Then for any two distinct coalitions c 1 , c 2 ∈ C, we have c 1 ∩ c 2 = ∅. Thus, C pe ⊆ C le . We now show that C le ⊆ C coe by using strong induction on the size of the set N .
The base case (when |N | = 1) is trivial. Thus, we move to the inductive step: Suppose that the relation C le ⊆ C coe holds when |N | ≤ s, where s ≥ 1. We need to show that the relation C le ⊆ C coe holds when |N | = s + 1. Hence, suppose that |N | = s + 1.
Consider an arbitrary C ∈ C le . We need to show that C ∈ C coe . To do that, we need to find a path P in accordance with coalition structure C. If C = ∅ then any path works. Thus, suppose that C = ∅. Also, note that for any path P the agents in N are subsequently ordered. Thus, wlog. let N / ∈ C.
Since C = ∅ and N / ∈ C, there exists c ∈ C such that c ⊂ N and for each c ∈ C, c ⊂ c. Let C 1 = { c ∈ C| c ⊆ c} and C 2 = C C 1 . Note that |c| ≤ s, |N c| ≤ s, and the coalition structures C 1 and C 2 are laminar. Then, by our inductive hypothesis: There exist paths P 1 and P 2 , whose sets of vertices are c and N c (in order), such that P 1 is in accordance with C 1 and P 2 is in accordance with C 2 . Now consider the path P : P 1 − P 2 (i.e., the agents in c are ordered at the beginning as in P 1 , and then the agents in N c are ordered at the end as in P 2 ). It is clear that P is in accordance with C. Thus, C ∈ C coe . Therefore, C le ⊆ C coe .
(2) We now show that C coe ⊆ C cee .
Let C ∈ C coe . All we need is to show that C ∈ C cee . Let P be a path in accordance with coalition structure C. Wlog., let P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. To ease exposition, we will denote a coalition c ∈ C by [j ′ , j] where j ′ and j are, in order, the smallest-index and the largest-index agents in c.
To prove the desired result we first construct a list L whose elements are * 's and the agents in N . We begin with the empty ordered list L = (). Then we expand L by inserting in the list * 's and agents using the following algorithm:
For j = 1 . . . n: 1. Redefine L by inserting j at the end. 2. If there are no coalitions in C of the form [j ′ , j] where j ′ = j, proceed with the next iteration.
Otherwise, among coalitions of the form [j ′ , j]
where j ′ = j, let the smallest value that j ′ takes be j * . 4. Let r be the number of elements ( * 's and agents) that come after j * up to j (including j). 5. Redefine L by inserting r consecutive * 's at the end, and then proceed with the next iteration.
We now show by induction that after the iteration for j, the list L is such that:
-For each coalition j, j ∈ C where j = j and j ≤ j, the number of consecutive * 's that succeed j is at least as many as the number of elements that succeed j up to agent j (including j).
The base case, when j = 1, is trivial: After the iteration for j = 1 we obtain that L = (1) and the desired result holds vacuously. Hence, we move to the inductive step.
Suppose that the above statement is true after the iteration for j = s where s ≥ 1. We need to show that the statement is true after the iteration for j = s + 1. Consider the iteration for j = s + 1.
If there are no coalitions in C of the form [j ′ , s + 1] where j ′ = s + 1, after the iteration the list L remains unchanged with the exception that agent s + 1 has been inserted at the end. The desired result then follows from the inductive hypothesis. (This is because the part of the list that comes before agent s + 1 did not change.)
Suppose that there are coalitions in C of the form [j ′ , s + 1] where j ′ = s + 1. Let j * and r be as defined in the algorithm. Then after the iteration the list L remains unchanged with the exception that agent s + 1, followed by r consecutive * 's, are inserted at the end. For coalitions of the form j, j ∈ C where j < s + 1 the desired result follows from the inductive hypothesis. For coalitions of the form j, s + 1 ∈ C the desired results follows by our choices of j * and r. Thus, the list L is as desired.
We now use the list L produced by the above algorithm to show that C ∈ C cee : Consider the following planar representation: In the Cartesian space the agents 1, 2, · · · , n are subsequently positioned on a line, and the distance between agents j and j +1 is 1+(the number of * 's in the list L between agents j and j + 1). For a coalition of the form [j, j] ∈ C, draw a circle such that its radius is 1/2, and agent j lies at the circle's center. For a coalition of the form [j ′ , j] ∈ C where j ′ = j, draw a circle such that its radius is the distance between agents j ′ and j, and agent j ′ lies at the circle's center. By construction of L this planar representation is in accordance with coalition structure C. Therefore, C ∈ C cee .
(3) We now show that C ne ⊂ C pe ⊂ C le for |N | ≥ 2. For |N | ≥ 2, observe that:
Therefore, for |N | ≥ 2, C ne ⊂ C pe ⊂ C le .
For |N | ≥ 3, observe that: {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} / ∈ C le . Note that the path P : 1 − 2 − 3 is in accordance with this coalition structure. Thus, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} ∈ C coe . Therefore, if |N | ≥ 3, C le ⊂ C coe .
(5)
We now show that C coe ⊂ C cee for |N | ≥ 4.
Let |N | ≥ 4. Let C = {{1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 1}, {4, 1, 2}} . To see that C ∈ C cee , consider the following planar representation: Agents 1, 2, 3, 4 lie at the four corners of a unit square. Each agent lies at the center of a circle with radius 1. It is easy to verify that this planar representation is in accordance with coalition structure C. Therefore, C ∈ C cee .
Suppose that C ∈ C coe . Let P be a path in accordance with coalition structure C. Since {1, 2, 3} ∈ C and {2, 3, 4} ∈ C, it must be that under P the agents 1, 2, 3, 4 are ordered next to one another. By symmetry of C w.r.t. agents we can assume wlog. that P = · · ·−1−2−3−4−· · ·. But then under P the agents in {3, 4, 1} ∈ C are not subsequently ordered, a contradiction. Thus, C / ∈ C coe . Since C / ∈ C coe but C ∈ C cee , we have C coe ⊂ C cee for |N | ≥ 4. (N ) . This is because by definition any coalition structure C is a subset of P ≥1 (N ). We finally show that
The observation that P ≥1 (N ) / ∈ C ne ∪ C pe ∪ C le is trivial and left for the reader.
Suppose that P ≥1 (N ) ∈ C coe . Then, there exists a path P in accordance with P ≥1 (N ). By symmetry of P ≥1 (N ) w.r.t. agents we can assume wlog. that P = 1 − 2 − · · · − n. But then agents 1 and 3 are not subsequently ordered under P , a contradiction. Thus,
Suppose that P ≥1 (N ) ∈ C cee . Then, there exists a planar representation (φ, ψ) in accordance with P ≥1 (N ). Under (φ, ψ), consider the circles corresponding to coalitions {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}. It must be that either a distinct agent lies at each of these three circles' center or there is an agent that lies at the center of at least two circles. For this latter case, wlog. suppose that agent 1 lies at the center of the circles corresponding to coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3}. Wlog., let ψ 2 ({1, 2}) ≥ ψ 2 ({1, 3}). But then agent 3 lies inside the circle corresponding to coalition {1, 2}, a contradiction. Thus, a distinct agent lies at the center of each of these three circles.
Wlog., let agents 1, 2, 3 lie at the centers of the circles corresponding to coalitions {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}, respectively. For coalition {1, 2}, since 3 lies outside of the circle corresponding to this coalition, we must have ψ 2 ({3, 1}) > ψ 2 ({1, 2}). Using similar arguments for coalitions coalitions {2, 3} and {3, 1}, we find that ψ 2 ({1, 2}) > ψ 2 ({2, 3}) and ψ 2 ({2, 3}) > ψ 2 ({3, 1}). But then we get ψ 2 ({3, 1}) > ψ 2 ({1, 2}) > ψ 2 ({2, 3}) > ψ 2 ({3, 1}), a contradiction. Therefore, C ∈ C cee . This completes our proof. ◭
Appendix B
We now prove that laminar equilibrium always exists in two-resource RSGs. We first present what we call "the two-color theorem of laminarity"(Theorem 15), the proof of which can be found in the Appendix. It lies at the heart of the proof of Theorem 6, the main result of this section. We believe that our two-color theorem may also be of independent interest, in particular, in future studies on laminarity. In simple terms it states that for any N ′ ⊆ N and any laminar coalition structure C, the set N ′ can be partitioned into two subsets of about equal size (i.e., into N ′ B and N ′
such that for each c ∈ C, the set of coalition members in N ′ (i.e., N ′ ∩ c) also becomes partitioned into two subsets of about equal size (i.e., ||N ′ B ∩ c| − |N ′ W ∩ c|| ≤ 1). (The agents in N ′ B and N ′ W are referred to as "black agents" and "white agents," respectively, and hence is the name of the theorem).
◮ Theorem 15. (the two-color theorem of laminarity) Let
Then, for any laminar coalition structure C, the set N ′ can be partitioned into the subsets N ′ B and N ′
Proof. We first equip ourselves with some new terms and tools. Suppose that C is such that N ∈ C and P =1 (N ) ⊆ C. For c, c ′ ∈ C, we say that "c is a child of c ′ ," and "c ′ is the mother of c," if c ⊂ c ′ and there does not exist c ′′ ∈ C such that c ⊂ c ′′ ⊂ c ′ . We recursively define the sets C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C t as follows:
and for 2 ≤ s ≤ t,
Above, t is set such that C t is non-empty and no coalition in C t has a child in C.
For c ∈ C, let #(c) be the number of children of c. For #(c) > 0, we label the children of c as c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c #(c) . To make precise our labeling we use the following rule: among coalitions c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c #(c) , c 1 is the one that includes the smallest-index agent; among coalitions c 2 , · · · , c #(c) , c 2 is the one that includes the smallest-index agent; and so on. Note that, since P =1 (N ) ⊆ C, c = c 1 ∪ c 2 ∪ · · · ∪ c #(c) . We are now ready to proceed with our proof.
We can assume wlog that N ∈ C and P =1 (N ) ⊆ C: If not, we redefine the set C as follows: C : C ∪ {N } ∪ P =1 (N ). Then, when we identify the sets N ′ B and N ′ W such that the theorem's requirements are satisfied for redefined C, clearly the theorem's requirements are also satisfied for C before we redefined it. That is why the assumption that N ∈ C and P =1 (N ) ⊆ C is innocuous.
We prove the theorem using mathematical induction on s as follows:
Inductive
Step:
Note that when the proof by mathematical induction is done, the sets N ′ B = N t B and N ′ W = N t W satisfy the requirements in the theorem.
Showing the base case is trivial: Clearly, C 1 = {N }. Then, any two sets N 1 B ⊆ N ′ and N 1 W = N ′ N 1 B , where N 1 B = k, will be as required.
We now show the inductive step: Suppose the inductive hypothesis is true. Let N s+1
(The arguments are similar for the case when N s+1
) Let c * ∈ C s be the mother of c. By the inductive hypothesis,
Since c is a child of c * and N s+1 B ∩ c − N s+1 W ∩ c ≥ 2, the above inequality implies that there exists l ∈ {1, · · · , #(c * )} such that
and N s+1 W as follows:
Note that: and N s+1 W can be redefined until the inductive conclusion is satisfied. This concludes our proof. ◭ We next state Lemma 16, which present a characterization of the sort of profitable deviations that may arise in a two-resource RSG in a Nash equilibrium when T 1 = {1, 2}. The proof of Lemma 16 is in the Appendix. ◮ Lemma 16. In a two-resource RSG, suppose that T 1 = {1, 2} and T 2 = ∅. Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium such that for resources i and i ′ , |a i | = q i and |a i ′ | = q i ′ − 1. Then, for c ∈ P ≥1 (N ) , a is c-stable if and only if the conditions C1, C2, and C3 below are satisfied:
Proof. Let T 1 = {1, 2} and T 2 = ∅. Let a be a Nash equilibrium such that |a i | = q i and |a i ′ | = q i ′ − 1. We prove the two parts of the biconditional statement separately.
(only if)
By way of contradiction, suppose that a is c-stable but one of the conditions in the lemma is not satisfied.
If C1 is not satisfied, then a i ′ ∩ c = ∅ and |a i ∩ c| ≥ 2. Consider an agent j ∈ a i ∩ c. Note that the set (a i ∩ c) {j} is non-empty. Consider the deviation (c 1 , c 2 ) such that c i ′ = {j} and c i = c {j}. It is clear that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a contradiction. Therefore, if a is c-stable the condition C1 is satisfied.
If C2 is not satisfied, then β i = β i ′ , |a i ′ ∩ c| > 0, and |a i ∩ c| ≥ |a i ′ ∩ c| + 2. Let |a i ′ ∩ c| = k and |a i ∩ c| = k + 2 + s, where k > 0 and s ≥ 0. Let c ⊂ a i ∩ c be such that | c| = k + 1. Consider the deviation (c 1 , c 2 ) such that c i ′ = c and c i = c c. It is clear that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a contradiction. Therefore, if a is c-stable the condition C2 is satisfied.
Consider the deviation (c 1 , c 2 ) such that c i ′ = c and c i = c c. It is clear that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation by coalition c at a, a contradiction. Therefore, if a is c-stable the condition C3 is satisfied.
Therefore, if a is c-stable, then the conditions given in the lemma are all satisfied.
(if)
By way of contradiction, suppose that for allocation a the conditions C1, C2, C3 are satisfied but a is not c-stable. Then there exists a profitable deviation (c 1 , c 2 ) at allocation a. Let a ′ = a • (c 1 , c 2 ).
Suppose that for some resource
the cost that j incurs at a ′ is greater than u. But at a the cost that j incurs is less than or equal to u (because a is a Nash equilibrium; see Proposition 1). This contradicts that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation at a. Thus, it must be that for each resource
Then it is clear that the sum of the costs incurred by members of coalition c is the same at allocations a and a ′ . But then, if at a ′ an agent in c is better off (compared to at a), it must be that another agent in c is worse off at a ′ . But then (c 1 , c 2 ) cannot be a profitable deviation at a, a contradiction. Therefore, we must have
If a i ′ ∩c = ∅, then by C1 we get |a i ∩ c| ≤ 1. Since c is non-empty, we get |a i ∩ c| = 1 and |c| = 1. But then (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation by a single-agent coalition, contradicting that a is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain that a i ′ ∩ c = ∅. Let |a i ′ ∩ c| = k where k > 0.
Suppose that β i > β i ′ . Consider an agent j ∈ a i ′ ∩ c. Note that the cost that j incurs at a is β i ′ , and the cost that j incurs at a ′ is either β i or u. Either way j is worse off at allocation a ′ , contradicting that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation at a. Therefore, β i ≤ β i ′ .
Suppose that β i = β i ′ . Then, by C2, we find that |a i ∩ c| = s where s ≤ k + 1. Since
At a the agents in a i ′ ∩c incur a cost equal to β i ′ < u. Hence, at a ′ they cannot be assigned to resource i ′ (where the cost incurred is u). Therefore,
Since we also know that s ≤ k + 1, we obtain that s = k + 1. Then a i ′ ∩ c = a ′ i ∩ c. This means that at a ′ , agents in a i ′ ∩ c are assigned to resource i and incur a cost equal to β i , and agents in a i ∩ c are assigned to resource i ′ and incur a cost equal to u. But then all agents are equally well off at a ′ and a, contradicting that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation at a. Therefore, β i = β i ′ .
Suppose that β i < β i ′ . Then, by C3, we find that
Note that at a the agents in a i ′ ∩ c incur a cost equal to β i ′ < u, and hence at a ′ they cannot be assigned to resource i ′ (where the cost incurred is u). Therefore,
But this contradicts with the fact that s ≤ k. Therefore, β i < β i ′ cannot be true.
Since our supposition that (c 1 , c 2 ) is a profitable deviation at a always leads to a contradiction, we find that when the conditions C1, C2, C3 are satisfied, the allocation a is c-stable.
This concludes our proof. ◭ Before presenting and proving the main result of this section, we will introduce some new tools.
The γ-value of an allocation a w.r.t. a coalition structure C, to be denoted by γ(a, C), is defined as follows:
Loosely speaking, the γ-value of allocation a is a cumulative measure of how "widely" coalitions are spread to resources at allocation a.
The β-value of an allocation a, to be denoted by β(a), is defined as follows:
That is, the β-value of allocation a is the sum of the costs at resources at allocation a.
We say that allocation a ′ γβ-dominates allocation a w.r.t. C if γ(a ′ , C) > γ(a, C) or if γ(a ′ , C) = γ(a, C) and β(a ′ ) < β(a).
Let A ⊆ A be a subset of allocations. Clearly, there exists a ∈ A such that, for each a ′ ∈ A {a}, either a γβ-dominates a ′ w.r.t. C, or a and a ′ cannot be compared according to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t. C. We refer to such an allocation a as a "maximal element in A according to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t. C." Note that there may be more than one maximal elements in A.
We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 6. We show the existence of a C-stable allocation separately for the following three cases:
Let allocation a be a Nash equilibrium. (Its existence is by Theorem 3.)
By Theorem 3, |T 1 | = |T 2 | = 1; and |a 1 | = q 1 and |a 2 | = q 2 . But then, it is trivial to see that a is a super strong equilibrium and hence it is C-stable.
By Theorem 3, either |a 1 | = q 1 − 1 and |a 2 | = q 2 or |a 1 | = q 1 and |a 2 | = q 2 − 1. Thus,
we obtain that for each c ∈ C, N B ∩ c ≤ N W ∩ c + 1. Therefore, for allocation a ′ such that a ′ 1 = N B and a ′ 2 = N W , the conditions C1 and C2 in Lemma 16 are satisfied while the condition C3 is not applicable. (To ease comparison with lemma conditions, note that i and i ′ in the lemma statement are 1 and 2 in here, in order.) Therefore, by Lemma 16, a ′ is C-stable.
If a is C-stable, we are done. If not, we proceed as follows: We show the existence of an allocation a ′ such that a ′ is a Nash equilibrium and a ′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C. This proves that a C-stable allocation exists because: If a ′ turns out to be C-stable, we are done. Otherwise, we can iterate the same arguments: We can find an allocation a ′′ such that a ′′ is a Nash equilibrium and a ′′ γβ-dominates a ′ w.r.t. C, and so on. Since there exists a maximal element in the set of Nash equilibria according to the γβ-domination relation w.r.t. C, our iterations must eventually yield a C-stable allocation.
Therefore, suppose that a is not C-stable. Let i, i ′ ∈ {1, 2} be such that |a i | = q i and |a i ′ | = q i ′ − 1.
By Lemma 16, there exists c ∈ C such that one of the conditions C1, C2, and C3 in Lemma 16 is not satisfied. Since β 1 = β 2 , C2 is not applicable. Thus, either C1 or C3 is not satisfied.
Suppose that the condition C1 is not satisfied. Then, there exists c ∈ C such that |a i ′ ∩ c| = 0 and |a i ∩ c| ≥ 2. Let j, j ′ ∈ a i ∩ c, j = j ′ . Let allocation a ′ be such that
By Theorem 3, a ′ is a Nash equilibrium. Also, note that γ (a ′ , C) > γ (a, C) because:
(Because agents in N c are allocated to resources in exactly the same way at allocations a and a ′ .)
(Because 1 (c, a i ) + 1 (c, a i ′ ) = 1, and hence, 1 (c ′ , a i ) + 1 (c ′ , a i ′ ) = 1.)
Thus, as required, allocation a ′ is a Nash equilibrium and a ′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C.
Suppose that the condition C3 is not satisfied. Thus, β i < β i ′ and there exists c ∈ C such that |a i ∩ c| > |a i ′ ∩ c| > 0. Let k be such that |a i ′ ∩ c| = k − 1. Note that |a i ∩ c| ≥ k ≥ 2.
For each j ∈ a i ′ ∩ c, we define agent j as follows: Let c ∈ C be such that c ⊆ c, a i ∩ c = ∅, and there does not exist c ∈ C such that c ⊂ c and a i ∩ c = ∅. Let j be the smallest-index agent in a i ∩ c.
♣ (This is because of how we defined j and c above: for j ∈ a i ′ ∩ c, agent j is selected from within the set a i ∩ c where c ⊆ c ′ ; thus, j = j and j, j ∈ S i,i ′ ∩ c ′ .)
We now apply Theorem 15 by setting
Clearly, at a ′ we have |a ′ i | = q i − 1 and |a ′ i ′ | = q i ′ . Hence, by Theorem 3, a ′ is a Nash equilibrium. Note that γ (a ′ , C) ≥ γ (a, C) because: -For each c ′ ∈ C such that c ′ ∩ c = ∅, 1 (c ′ , a i ) + 1 (c ′ , a i ′ ) = 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ) + 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ′ ) .
-For each c ′ ∈ C such that c ⊆ c ′ , 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ) + 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ′ ) ≥ 1 (c ′ , a i ) + 1 (c ′ , a i ′ ) .
(Because S i,i ′ ⊆ c, S i,i ′ ≥ 3, and hence, by application of Theorem 15 we obtain that 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ) = 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ′ ) = 1.) -For each c ′ ∈ C such that c ′ ⊂ c and |c ′ | = 1, 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ) + 1 (c ′ , a ′ i ′ ) = 1 (c ′ , a i ) + 1 (c ′ , a i ′ ) = 1.
(Because at any allocation a single agent is assigned to exactly one resource.)
-For each c ′ ∈ C such that c ′ ⊂ c and |c ′ | ≥ 2,
(Because: If c ′ ⊆ (a i ∩ c) or c ′ ⊆ (a i ′ ∩ c), we get 1 (c ′ , a i ) + 1 (c ′ , a i ′ ) = 1 and the desired result follows. If 1(c ′ , a i ) + 1(c ′ , a i ′ ) = 2, then S i,i ′ ∩ c ′ ≥ 2. (See the bullet argument above indicated with ♣.) Hence the desired result follows by application of Theorem 15.
Note that β(a ′ ) = α + β i , β(a) = α + β i ′ , and since β i < β i ′ , we get β(a ′ ) < β(a). Since γ (a ′ , C) ≥ γ (a, C) and β(a ′ ) < β(a), we obtain that a ′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C. Thus, as required, allocation a ′ is a Nash equilibrium and a ′ γβ-dominates a w.r.t. C.
This concludes our proof. It is clear from the figure that C ∈ C coe . In this game we will show that no allocation is C-stable. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a C-stable allocation a.
Since P =1 (N ) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Using Theorem 3, we obtain that there are two possibilities: |a 1 | = 3 and |a 2 | = 3 or |a 1 | = 2 and |a 2 | = 4. Note that at a, it must be that at most one agent in c 1 is assigned to the high resource. Otherwise, at a coalition c 1 has a profitable deviation: If one agent in the coalition deviates to the other resource, the other resource now becomes high. Thus, the well-being of the agent that deviates remains the same (it is still assigned to a high resource) while the other agent (now assigned to a low resource) becomes better off. The same argument applies for coalitions c 2 and c 3 .
Note that if resource 2 is high at a (i.e., |a 2 | = 4), it must be that c 1 ⊂ a 2 or c 2 ⊂ a 2 or c 3 ⊂ a 2 . We showed that this cannot be true. Therefore, at a resource 1 is high and resource 2 is low (i.e., |a 1 | = 3 and |a 2 | = 3).
Since resource 1 is high, we cannot have c 1 ⊂ a 1 or c 2 ⊂ a 1 or c 3 ⊂ a 1 . But then, since |a 1 | = 3, it must be that |a 1 ∩ c 1 | = |a 1 ∩ c 2 | = |a 1 ∩ c 3 | = 1. Consider coalition c 2 . If 3 ∈ a 1 , we obtain that c 4 is such that |a 1 ∩ c 4 | = 2 and |a 2 ∩ c 4 | = 1. If 4 ∈ a 1 , we obtain that c 5 is such that |a 1 ∩ c 5 | = 2 and |a 2 ∩ c 5 | = 1. Wlog., suppose that the former case is true. But then at a consider the following deviation for c 4 : Each agent in c 4 deviates to the other resource. The deviation makes resource 1 low and resource 2 high. Note that at the induced allocation the agents that deviated to resource 2 are equally well-off (they are still assigned to a high resource) and the agent that deviated to resource 1 is better off (because now it assigned to a low resource for which the beta value is smaller). But then this is a profitable deviation, a contradiction. In this game we will show that no allocation is C-stable. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists an allocation a such that a is C-stable.
Since P =1 (N ) ⊂ C, a is a Nash equilibrium. Using Theorem 3 above, we obtain that at a one resource is assigned two agents and the other one is assigned three agents. Wlog., let |a 1 | = 2 and |a 2 | = 3.
Suppose that 1 ∈ a 1 . Then, in {5, 2, 3, 4} there is one agent assigned to resource 1 and there are three agents assigned to resource 2. But then at a the coalition {5, 2, 3, 4} has a profitable deviation: Wlog., let a 1 = {1, 2} and a 2 = {3, 4, 5}. At a, if agent 2 deviates to resource 2 and agents 3, 4 deviate to resource 1, agent 5 becomes better off and the wellbeings of the remaining agents in coalition {5, 2, 3, 4} do not change. This contradicts that a is C-stable. Thus, 1 ∈ a 2 . Now suppose that 4 ∈ a 1 . But then the preceding arguments can be repeated for coalition {1, 2, 3, 5}, leading to a contradiction. Thus, 4 ∈ a 2 . Therefore, a 2 is {1, 2, 4} or {1, 3, 4} or {1, 4, 5}. But then we obtain that for coalitions {1, 2} or {3, 4} or {5, 4}, at least one of them is a subset of a 2 . But then at a this coalition has a profitable deviation: If one agent in the coalition deviates to resource 1, this agent's well-being remains the same while the other agent in the coalition becomes better off. This contradics that a is C-stable. Therefore, a is not C-stable. ◭
